The Operation Hawkeye strike and retaliation against ISIS in Syria
On December 13, 2025, two U.S. soldiers and one civilian interpreter were killed in Palmyra, a city in central Syria. The shooter, a lone ISIS affiliated Gunman, was eliminated soon after by Syrian security forces belonging to the transitional government of new President Ahmed al-Sharaa. Less than a week later, on December 19, the U.S. Central Command launched Operation Hawkeye, a military retaliation strike targeting ISIS infrastructure and leadership in Syria. Supported by the Jordanian military, the multi-wave response struck more than 70 targets across Syria and Iraq, resulting in 10 separate operations and concluding with a count of 23 terrorist operatives killed or detained.
In the immediate aftermath of American casualties, such a response seemed inevitable. Yet, these events raise the broader and more controversial question of whether U.S. military retaliation against terrorist forces actually reduces the threat of terrorism or simply sustains the cycle of violence with no foreseeable end. Although the airstrikes in response to ISIS were a justified response to the immediate security threats and a demonstration of power, they failed to address the root cause of terrorism and provide justification for continued violence.
The U.S., as both a military superpower and a prominent power in international politics and conflict, has both a moral and political obligation to respond to terrorist attacks such as the one on December 13. Not only would a failure to retaliate be seen as a sign of weakness and submission, but retaliating at a lower or equal magnitude to the initial aggression would not be regarded as enough. In order to fully back up the U.S. projection of “don’t mess with us,” responses have to showcase ruthlessness and inspire fear in order to scare away future aggressions. This is clearly introduced by the U.S. Central Command statement: “If you harm our warfighters, we will find you and kill you anywhere in the world, no matter how hard you try to evade justice.” Overall, a failure to counteract would inspire domestic unrest, harm the military credibility of the country, and invite further offenses, as was the case with the conflict between the U.S. and Japan before WWII. During Japan’s expansion across eastern Asia in the 1930s, the U.S. avoided direct military confrontation, which allowed transgressions accumulate leading up to the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941. Domestically, the attack triggered shock, anger, and doubt, while internationally it exposed the limits of deterrence without enforcement. This example demonstrates how perceived inaction can be seen as a sign of weakness and invite further attacks rather than prevent them.
However, these justified retaliations of military force fail to solve terrorism and stop it from continuing. Airstrikes, such as the ones performed by Operation Hawkeye, help eliminate current threats but fuel anti-American sentiment that consequently produces more militants. The violence perpetuated by these strikes and operations, in which civilian casualties occur as well, reinforces extremist ideology as the U.S. ostensibly fights fire with fire, which spurs recruitment narratives for terrorist organizations. Retaliation validates the belief that violence is the only means to solidify power and maintain the upper hand, therefore barring long-term political or ideological solutions. Past U.S. conflicts with extremist groups in the Middle East reveal a consistent pattern of weakening organizations but rarely eliminating them. Previous examples, such as those including Al-Qaeda and ISIS, show that strikes often result in civilian casualties (strikes against ISIS resulted in over 1,300 civilian deaths according to the U.S.-led coalition’s intelligence, with external sources estimating between 8,310 and 13,187+ since 2014) and regional instability while rarely providing lasting political solutions.
Not doing anything never was and will never be a realistic option, especially in the face of American casualties. However, using the same strategy over and over and expecting a different result only leads to continued and escalated conflict. If the U.S. hopes to eliminate terrorism rather than sustain and incite it, responses must be prepared with broader efforts next to military force to prevent further radicalization and restabilize affected regions. To break the cycle and inspire true change, the U.S. must move beyond the impulse to display strength and instead confront the conditions that fuel violence before retaliation becomes inevitable.
