A February 2026 update of U.S policy towards Greenland
While recent headlines concerning Trump’s imperialist intentions toward Greenland certainly suggest a unique historical moment, this is not the first time the United States has tried to expand into its icier neighbor. In 1916, the United States first pressured Denmark to sell Greenland – President Woodrow Wilson fearing not Russian or Chinese incursion but rather German intervention. Ultimately rejected in this pursuit (a failure supposedly repeated by Truman), the United States agreed to just purchase the Danish West Indies in 1917, a compromise that brought the country further toward hemispheric domination. In a now ironic 1916 statement, Secretary of State Robert Lansing promised that “the United States of America will not object to the Danish Government extending its political and economic interests to the whole of Greenland.” Still, this compromise only lasted until the next threat to Greenland’s sovereignty. In 1941, one year after Nazi Germany forcibly took over Denmark, the United States signed a pact, assuming responsibility for Greenland’s security. For the remainder of World War II, a briefly US-occupied Greenland saw the installation of American weather systems, mine protection, and bases. Greenland’s cryolite, a vital component of aluminum, also became crucial to aircraft production. Bases created during this period persist to the modern day. But recent comments by the Trump administration risk this past century of cooperation and mutual protection between Greenland (Denmark) and the United States. Through this crisis, Trump continues to make clear the new priorities of the American state, with a thirst for resources superseding alliances and expansionism outweighing global stability.
The genre of action proposed for Greenland risks eroding the relationship between the United States and Denmark, among its most tested allies. Cooperation between Denmark and the United States dates back through the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, with the United States aiding Denmark in its European wars and Denmark reciprocating in Afghanistan. As a result, Trump’s derisive comments, such as that Denmark and other NATO allies “stayed a little back, little off the front lines” during the Afghan war, intensified growing resentment among the Danes—especially given that Denmark lost more soldiers than any other country, on a per capita basis, in Afghanistan. Now, Danish veterans express sadness that a country they once trusted with Europe’s survival may pose its greatest threat. Americans face loss from tensions as well. As of 2019, more than 123,000 jobs existed in the United States because of trade with Denmark. If tariffs threatened by Trump come to fruition and the existing trading relationship weakens, jobs may be lost, a worrisome possibility at a time of economic uncertainty.
Similar to recent operations in Venezuela, aggressive actions towards Greenland seemingly derive largely from interest in natural resources. The Trump administration claims its interest comes from eagerness to protect, not exploit, the island’s resources and location. Such arguments, however, are called into question by Denmark’s open offer for the United States to bring as many troops and create as many bases as desired—already permitted under Cold War-era agreements. While only 100 military personnel are now permanently stationed at a North Greenland base, the language of the 1951 agreement allows for the United States to “construct, install, maintain, and operate” and “house personnel” as wished. Thus, the inclusion of rare earth minerals, uranium, and iron, all of which are increasingly accessible with global warming melting the ice cap, likely represents much of Trump’s motivation. Former National Security Advisor Mike Waltz even said, when interviewed by Fox News, that the focus of Trump’s administration on the island was “about critical minerals” and “natural resources.” Furthermore, the promise of eventually lowering oil and gas prices with what scientists believe are significant oil and gas reserves hidden beneath the ice is likely to be factored in as well.
Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) confirmed that planning is underway for a new Arctic mission, reflecting the development of Greenland’s security from a topic of United States-Denmark negotiation to one worthy of supranational concern. The proposed operation, reportedly titled Arctic Sentry and ordered by NATO commander General Alexus G. Grynkewich, follows months of escalating tensions triggered by President Donald Trump’s insistence that American control of Greenland is a strategic necessity. While other officials emphasize that planning and details, including the mission’s location, remain preliminary, the trajectory of this project is clear. To address the Russian and Chinese threat to which the U.S. claims to respond, they hope to enhance vigilance activities, expand multinational exercises near the Arctic Circle, and to recalibrate NATO’s position in the north, rendering further protection through American occupation unnecessary. Trump’s earlier assertions that the United States would acquire Greenland “one way or the other,” including by force, unsettled allies. NATO member countries, reliant on the United States but legally tied to Greenland’s security through their NATO membership, become increasingly disillusioned with Trump’s destabilizing threats—an enduring concern for the health of these alliances. The Prime Minister of Greenland, Jens-Fredrik Nielsen, warned the United States to stop the goals of ownership and control; otherwise, truly defensive measures will begin. Still, for now, Arctic Sentry appears less an immediate defensive measure than a cautious appeasement.
Negative international response spanned beyond allies to other dominant world powers who see a militarized Greenland as requiring a strategic response. Russia warned that any attempt by the United States to gain control over Greenland or to deploy a “golden dome” missile defense system on the island (modeled after Israel’s Iron Dome) would necessitate a direct response. During his visit to China on February 3rd, Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov warned that “Moscow would not ignore what it views as a strategic encroachment into the Arctic.” His remarks come at a particularly sensitive moment as the bilateral U.S.-Russia nuclear arms control pact expires in February, narrowing the constraints on escalation between the powers. By contrast, Trump asserts that “world peace” and Greenland’s independence from Russia and China requires a complete U.S. takeover — even though the United States, through NATO, theoretically already assumes Greenland’s responsibility, making such action unnecessary if truly for those reasons. Beijing’s position is more complex. The U.S. and Denmark historically limited Chinese state-owned firms from expanding airport infrastructure and buying naval bases in Greenland; American control would likely further block access to Greenland’s minerals and strategic location and also potentially challenge their near-monopoly on rare earth minerals.
Operations in Venezuela and Iran, combined with those proposed in Greenland, show a much transformed version of American foreign policy. Such obvious prioritization of natural resource “grabs” risks undermining global stability, vital trade partnerships, and longstanding alliances—and pushing the U.S. toward involuntary isolation. U.S. action endangers regularizing territorial aggression without regard for alliances; at such a point, isolation might not be volitional, with Europe perhaps replacing the United States as a key trade and defense partner with rival superpowers such as China. While Maduro’s seizure in Venezuela elucidated new elements of Trump’s “Don-roe” riff on President Monroe’s eponymous policy, Greenland seems to represent an older power-based world order in which the strong pursue territorial and resource expansion without respect for existing populations and the international law ostensibly protecting them.
