Assassination Diplomacy

The Motivations for Israel’s Targeted Killings are not just Revenge

By: Walker Cox

The arm of the Israeli intelligence community is certainly long, powerful, and, invigorated by recent atrocities, bound to come down hard on the heads of Hamas leaders. Israel is justified in its response, but it is worth noting that Israel’s motivations may not be what they seem. Netanyahu’s government may be executing these assassinations to bolster public opinion and create an even more violent climate that Israel’s agenda can prevail in. 

Since Oct. 7th, 2023, Israel has killed four Hamas terrorists, in what the nation’s intelligence service, Shin Bet, is calling “our Munich,” in reference to the spree of killings Israel conducted after the massacre of 11 Israelis during the 1972 Munich Olympics by Palestinian terrorists. The question now is how closely the post-Munich Massacre operation and the post-October 7th operation, dubbed Nili, will parallel each other. The post-Munich operation spanned nations in its scope but began to peter out after its operatives misidentified a target and killed an innocent civilian in Lillehammer, Norway. 

Will Nili find the same fate, or will it succeed to “assassinate all the leaders of Hamas wherever they are,” as Prime Minister Netanyahu has instructed his intelligence forces? Frankly, it’s hard to believe Netanyahu’s dream to completely eradicate Hamas’ top brass will come to fruition. Gone are the days when Israeli spies could plant car bombs in France, Germany, or Turkey without major diplomatic repercussions. Indeed, Turkey and Qatar have warned Israel not to conduct assassinations within their borders. In Lebanon, however, Israel has operated with impunity, having, in its most recent assassination, killed a senior Hamas leader on the outskirts of Beirut with a drone strike. 

However feasible an operation Nili may be, the question remains of the blowback Israel might encounter. Most intelligence organizations today, including Israel’s, know that killing terrorist leaders is like cutting heads off the Hydra: there will always be more, incensed by the deaths of their idols, to replace those killed. Assassinations work to paralyze state actors, but Hamas is not a state. It is a violent movement whose members would be honored to be martyred by Israel and whose followers will only grow angrier. 

Hamas leader Saleh al-Arouri was killed in an Israeli drone strike in Beirut, Lebanon

The real reason Israel will kill those responsible for Oct. 7th is arguably based on public, domestic, and international, opinion. Netanyahu’s right-wing government was certainly not in a favorable position domestically or internationally before Oct. 7th. Seen as power-hungry and obsessed with national security, the invasion gave Netanyahu just what he needed to garner more support. Now, he has an opportunity to exact revenge for the deaths of Israelis through a praised and publicized assassination effort. Ironically, Netanyhu’s government has been propped up by war, and his targeted killing campaign will only serve as a spectacle at which to point in response to cries for revenge. 

Who can blame Israel for targeting the people who injured the nation so deeply? Certainly, America cannot. The United States invaded two whole countries after a terrorist attack. The people of Israel are well within their rights to kill Hamas leaders extrajudicially. However, American citizens and lawmakers should be careful to understand Netanyahu’s full motives. 

In the past, Israel’s targeted killing policy has been key in delegitimizing Israel’s enemies, disrupting the peace process, and making political avenues for Palestinian sovereignty difficult. For example, through the 1992 killing of terrorist Sheik Abbas al-Musawi and the violence that followed in its wake, Israel disrupted the Madrid peace conferences and gained an excuse to increase its military presence in Lebanon, the West Bank, and Gaza. The elimination of terrorists has never merely served to hinder their operations but instead to incite further violence against Israel that might paint Palestine as a mortal danger to the Israeli state, thus making a full occupation of Palestine seem a reasonable response to the international community. The idea that  Israel would want to incite violence seems counterintuitive, but we must ask ourselves the question: who would win in an all-out war, Israel or Palestine? Israel. Who, too, would win in a PR battle, Palestinian terrorists or IDF soldiers protecting their country? Behind the guise of revenge and protection lies dual motives of instigation and showmanship. 

Again, the United States cannot judge Israel’s assassination campaign nor withdraw support from our strategic ally. But by comprehending every motivation and dynamic of this conflict, we can bring both sides closer to peace. It remains to be seen what repercussions the recent assassinations will have and whether Israel will take advantage of them to further its own agenda. Either way, it is a lie that the Israeli and Palestinian peoples are irreconcilable—a lie that keeps both Netanyahu and Hamas in power. Both will continue to feed off the fear and rage of their constituents until there is nothing left of one or, perhaps, both of them.

A Black September Terrorist during the 1972 Munich Massacre